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I.

Introduction
By this appeal, DEI simply seeks an opportunity to assert setoff as an

affirmative defense to alleged rent payments. DEI's setoff right is contractual (R.
15 - R. 16,1f 25) and further exists as a matter of Utah law {see Mark VII Financial
Consultants Corp. v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 130, 132-33 (Utah App. 1990)). Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 13 expressly permits DEI to raise this defense, which
arises out of the same transaction and business between DEI and Bichler at issue in
this case.
Bichler attempts to block DEI's lawful defense by misstating DEI's
position and ignoring the relevant case law and contractual provisions. First,
Bichler ignores this Court's clear pronouncement of what constitutes a proper
counterclaim or defense in an unlawful detainer action, advocating for a more
restrictive "dependence of covenants" test that contradicts, and lacks any basis, in
Utah jurisprudence. Second, Bichler apparently fails to understand the basis of
DEI's claim of setoff, clearly set forth in the record below and the Appellant's
Brief, arguing somehow that DEI's claim against Bichler lacks "mutuality of
obligation." Last, Bichler asks this Court to ignore unequivocal case law that
demonstrates that the right of setoff exists apart from, and even in the absence of,
any contractual provision.
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In short, Bichler has failed to offer any basis upon which this Court
could deny DEI's appeal. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below and in the
Appellant' Brief, the District Court erred when it found that DEI's claim of setoff
was not a valid defense to Bichler's claims in the unlawful detainer action, and its
Order should be reversed.
II.

Argument
A.

DEI's Claim of Setoff is a Proper Defense in the Unlawful Detainer
Action Because it Arises Out of the Same Transaction and Business as
Bichler's Claim
Utah law permits DEI to raise any defense or counterclaim "arising

out of the same transaction or business as the subject matter of the complaint."
Bichler, however, misconstruing Utah law, and borrowing heavily from irrelevant
out-of-state case law, argues that "[a] 'proper counterclaim' is one that satisfies the
concept of dependence of covenants."

Apellee's Brief, p. 6. This position

contradicts Utah Supreme Court precedent, which permits a broader range of
counterclaims and defenses.
Bichler improperly attempts to limit the scope of valid defenses or
counterclaims under Utah's unlawful detainer statute by seizing on this Court's
reference to the "concept of dependence of covenants" in P.H. Investment v.
Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah 1991).

The "concept of dependence of

covenants," however, is not the test for determining whether a defense or
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counterclaim is proper in an unlawful detainer action under Utah law. To the
contrary, this Court has consistently held, including in it its opinion in P.H.
Investment, that a counterclaim or defense is "proper" in an unlawful detainer
action if it "aris[es] out of the same transaction or business as the subject matter of
the complaint." See, e.g., P.H. Investment, 818 P.2d at 1021; Lincoln Financial
Corp. v. Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah 1977).
Dependence of covenants is nothing more than the concept that a
tenant need not pay rent when the landlord has breached an express or implied
term of the lease because the tenant's covenant to pay rent is contingent on the
landlord's covenants in the lease. See Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168,
1180-181 (Cal. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 7.1. No Utah case,
nor the California case cited in P.H. Investment, has held that a valid counterclaim
or defense in an unlawful detainer action must satisfy the concept of dependence of
covenants. P.H. Investment, the only Utah case to use the phrase "dependence of
covenants" in the context of an unlawful detainer action, merely held that a
tenant's claim, which in that case was premised on the concept of dependant
covenants, was a permissive defense. See P.H. Investment, 818 P.2d at 1021
(citing Green, 517 P.2d at 1180-181).
The concept of dependant covenants is, at most, only one way to
determine whether a claim or defense in an unlawful detainer action "arisfes] out
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of the same transaction or business as the subject matter of the complaint." See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15. This Court should reject Bichler's baseless attempt
to narrow the test for determining what constitutes a proper defense or
counterclaim in an unlawful detainer action.1
B.

DEI's Claim for Setoff Has the Required Mutuality of Obligation
Bichler next argues that DEI's claim of setoff fails because it does not

satisfy the mutuality of obligation requirement for a valid setoff. Appellee's Brief,
pp. 9-11. Bichler asserts that there is no mutuality of obligation because DEI is
attempting to setoff debts owed by Bichler to ESG (DEI's parent company) against
DEI's debts to Bichler under the Lease Agreement. Bichler's argument, however,
entirely misstates the basis of DEI's claim of setoff against Bichler.
1

Bichler's reliance on out-of-state case law is equally misplaced. Bichler,
failing to find any Utah case law to support his position, asks this Court to look to
Arizona and Washington, arguing that the courts there have "found that a right of
setoff is not a valid counterclaim or defense to an unlawful detainer action." See
Appellee Brief, p. 7 (citing Colonial Tri-City Ltd. Partnership v. Ben Franklin
Stores, Inc., 880 P.2d 648 (Ariz. App. 1993J; Motoda v. Donohoe, 459 P.2d 654
(Wash. App. 1969)). Neither case, however, actually involves the assertion of a
setoff against the payment of rent. Critically, both Arizona law and Washington
law, unlike Utah law, expressly prohibit a court from considering any
counterclaims and offsets in an unlawful detainer action. See Colonial Tri-City,
880 P.2d at 653 (applying Arizona law: "a trial court hearing a section 33-361
action governed under the forcible entry and detainer statute may not consider
counterclaims, offsets, or cross claims..."); Motoda, 459 P.2d at 655 (applying
Washington law: "Defendants have not been permitted to assert offsets and
counterclaims in [an unlawful detainer action]."). Utah law contains no such
prohibition and, contrary to Washington and Arizona courts, Utah courts have
expressly allowed such defenses and counterclaims in unlawful detainer actions.
-4-

Mutuality of obligation exists when the debts are to andfromthe same
entities and in the same capacity. See In re Davidovich, 901 F.2d 1533, 1537 (10th
Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
RECOUPMENT AND SETOFF

See also 20

AM. JUR. 2D COUNTERCLAIM,

§ 49 ("the setoff...and the action must be between the

same parties and in the same capacity...."). The concept of capacity requires that
the parties must each owe the other something individually, i.e. in his or her own
name, and not as a trustee of a trust, or as a fiduciary or agent for some other party.
See In re Nuclear Imaging Systems, Inc., 260 B.R. 724, 734-35 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2000) (citing 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, % 553.03[3][c] (15th ed. rev. 1999)). See
also First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers, Inc., 610 P.2d 329, 333
(Utah 1980) ("It is only where the claim is held against a defendant in his fiduciary
capacity, and the right of setoff is asserted by him in an individual capacity (or vice
versa), that mutuality is lacking.").
DEI's claim of setoff here satisfies the mutuality of obligation
requirement. Bichler in this unlawful detainer action seeks to recover money
damages from DEI in its individual capacity under the Lease Agreement. DEI has
claimed a right to setoff against its rent obligations to Bichler the damages caused
by Bichler's breach of his Employment Agreement with DEI and his breach of
fiduciary duty as an officer of DEI. (R. 34; R. 88; R. 110 - R. 112). In both
instances, the debts owed are in the parties' individual capacities, and not as
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representatives of any third party. Although ESG has claims against Bichler for
his breach of the Purchase Agreement, DEI has not attempted in this action to
setoff those debts against its rent payment obligations to Bichler under the Lease
Agreement.
C.

DEFs Claim of Setoff Against its Rent Payment Obligations Are Not
Precluded by the Lease Agreement, and in any Event, Properly Exist
Apart from any Contractual Provision
Bichler finally argues that DEI cannot assert a claim of setoff against

its rent payment obligations because the "plain language" of Lease Agreement
precludes DEI from asserting any such claim.

Appellee's Brief, pp. 11-12.

Essentially, Bichler asks this Court to ignore the only reference to setoff in the
Lease Agreement, in favor of an irrelevant provision that makes no reference at all
to setoff.

Contrary to Bichler's position, the "plain language" of the Lease

Agreement expressly allows, not precludes, DEI to assert a claim of setoff against
its rent payment obligations. In any event, the terms of the Lease Agreement
regarding setoff are superfluous, as DEI's right of setoff properly exists apart from,
and even in the absence of, any contractual provision.
Bichler, relying on the Lease Agreement's definition of "material
default," contends that the Lease Agreement precludes DEI from asserting any
claim of setoff against the rent payment obligations. Appellee's Brief, p. 11. This
provision provides that a "material default" occurs upon "[DEI's] failure to pay
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any rent...to be paid by [DEI] as provided in the Lease strictly within the time
provided and in the amount as required by the terms of this Lease...." (R. 60).
This provision only means that DEI shall pay Bichler all money due under the
Lease Agreement. It does not prevent DEI from lawfully asserting any defense or
setoff to its obligation to pay rent under the Lease Agreement.
On the other hand, Paragraph 25 of the Lease Agreement, the only
provision in the Agreement to reference the term setoff, requires DEI, upon the
request of Bichler, to either certify that it has no claims of setoff to enforcement of
the Lease Agreement or to confirm such claims in writing. (R. 15 - R. 16, If 25)
("[DEI] shall...execute and deliver to [Bichler] a written declaration...certifying
that there are no defenses or offset against the enforcement of this lease by
[Bichler], or stating those claimed by [DEI].")

Paragraph 25's specific

authorization of setoff claims by DEI cannot be reconciled with Bichler's
construction of the Lease Agreement. The "plain language" of Paragraph 25
expressly authorizes DEI to assert a claim of setoff, or at a minimum, requires a
finding by the Court that the Lease Agreement is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence
must be considered to facilitate its interpretation, which the District Court failed to
allow. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12 (discussing Utah's rules of contract
interpretation).
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Bichler's position also fails because it erroneously assumes that a
right of setoff can only exist if it is afforded by contract. Appellee's Brief, pp. 1112. However, as a matter of law, a defendant's right of setoff is equitable and
properly exists apart from, and even in the absence of, any contractual provision.
See Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10 (discussing the legal basis for claims of setoff).
Accordingly, DEI's claim of setoff is proper even if the Lease Agreement does not
expressly afford DEI a right of setoff, which it does.

[Remainder of Page Left Intentionally Blank]
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III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, and those set forth in Appellant's

Brief, DEI respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's Order
granting summary judgment in favor of Bichler, with directions that DEI be
permitted to pursue its claim of setoff in this unlawful detainer action.
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